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Abstract 
Good governance or “government effectiveness” (per the World Bank) is seen as a critical 
factor for the wealth of nations insofar as it shapes political and economic institutions and 
affects overall economic performance. The quality of governance, in turn, depends on the 
attributes of the people involved. In an analysis based on international data, government 
effectiveness was related to the cognitive human capital of the society as a whole, of the 
intellectual class, and of leading politicians. The importance of cognitive capital was reflected in 
the rate of innovation, the degree of economic freedom, and country competitiveness, all of 
which were found to have an impact on the level of productivity (GDP per capita) and wealth 
(per adult). Correlation, regression, and path analyses involving N=98 to 201 countries showed 
that government effectiveness had a very strong impact on productivity and wealth (total 
standardized effects of =.56-.68). The intellectual class’s cognitive competence, seen as 
background factor and indicated by scores for the top 5 percent of the population on PISA, 
TIMSS and PIRLS, also had a strong impact (=.50-.54). Cross-lagged panel designs were used 
to establish causal directions, including backward effects from economic freedom and wealth on 
governance. The use of further controls showed no independent impacts on per capita wealth 
coming from geographical variables or natural resource rents. Finally, we discuss background 
factors and ways in which governance might be improved. 
 
Keywords: government effectiveness, human capital, cognitive ability, intelligence, 
economic freedom, innovation, competitiveness 
JEL code : D73, I20, O55, O41 
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Good governance, the benign and efficient management of society via decisions and 
institutions, can make a major contribution to the well-being of nations. Notorious 
examples of bad governance include China’s “Great Leap Forward” under Mao Zedong 
(from 1958 to 1961) resulting in a famine with 18 to 45 million deaths, and the 
dictatorships of Adolf Hitler, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, and Saddam Hussein. By contrast good 
governance promotes not only economic prosperity, but also freedom, the rule of law, 
human rights, security, and peace.  
How may good or bad governance affect society? Governance has an impact through 
the development and interpretation of law, the negotiation of agreements with other 
countries and international organizations, the shaping of political and economic 
institutions, influence on human capital development and demographic policies, the 
development and control of executive organs and the workforce in administration, 
bureaucracy, police, judiciary, military, customs, tax bodies, and technical inspection 
organs. Corruption and low quality in administration and economy are controlled; 
competence, efficiency and meritoric principles are encouraged. 
Since governance under modern conditions operates through many kinds of decisions 
and institutions, the development of cognitive capital is critical for its success. 
Educational policies are important for both the spread of basic skills and the emergence 
of specialists working in political, economic, and scientific institutions managing 
processes and developing new technologies. This view of governance is actively 
promoted by the World Bank and its researchers (Kaufmann, 2003). 
1 Human capital and cognitive ability theory 
Aristotle wrote in his Nicomachean Ethics (VI, 8, 1141b; 2009) that “Prudence is 
indeed the same quality of mind as statesmanship”, and that this prudence (or wisdom 
and intelligence) is mirrored in legislation. Modern human capital theory relates 
individual human capabilities to life outcomes such as job performance, marriage, and 
health (Becker, 1993/1964). Studies of diverse forms of human capital – diligence, 
conscientiousness, discipline and self-discipline, vitality, social competence, law-
abidingness, agreeableness, and cognitive ability –  have typically found the last of 
these to be the most important one. In statistical analyses of job performance, cognitive 
ability has the highest predictive validity of any form of human capital. Depending on 
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the criteria used and corrections for low reliability and variance restriction, the 
correlations and  values for cognitive ability are typically between .25 and .80 
(Salgado et al., 2003; Schmidt, 2012). Such results have been obtained in developing as 
well as developed countries (Meisenberg et al., 2006). In more complex jobs, the 
predictive validity of cognitive competence is even greater (e.g., r=.40-.58, Kuncel & 
Hezlett, 2010). The relationships hold regardless of whether the analysis is of a cross-
sectional or longitudinal nature (Irwing & Lynn, 2006; Kramer, 2009). 
One reason for these results is that cognitive ability tests are more reliable and valid 
than measures of other types of human capital. It is also the case that people differ in 
cognitive ability more so than they do with respect to fundamental traits. But 
differences are a prerequisite for correlational predictivity. Thus, a fundamental 
condition for successful job performance such as visual ability is not very predictive 
because blind people are rare and frequently excluded from consideration (e.g., from 
becoming a pilot). 
More importantly, job requirements call for cognitive abilities because many tasks 
are better addressed through the use of knowledge and deliberation. Especially in 
modern and more complex jobs, learning is a prerequisite to becoming an effective 
worker (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). ). Job requirements themselves are cognitively 
demanding, e.g. understanding instructions, orders, and security risks, prioritizing tasks, 
coming to a decision, processing, and integrating and evaluating information for solving 
problems. The performance of diverse professionals such as accountants, 
businesspeople, physicians, engineers, managers, and scientists depends on cognitive 
ability to one degree or another (Gottfredson, 2003). Cognitive ability is not only 
helpful in navigating the educational selection and competence building process in 
schools, but also in coping with conditions in jobs and in every day life, e.g. driving a 
car, managing income and property, selecting a mate, educating children, and engaging 
life in a healthy and sensible way. People with greater cognitive ability learn from their 
mistakes and can therefore mimic what works elsewhere (Kodila-Tedika, 2012, 2013). 
Intelligence is also positively related to patience, which enables players in institutions to 
develop a better understanding of the principles and rules that govern them (Kodila-
Tedika & Kanyama-Kalonda, 2012; Shamosh & Gray, 2008). 
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An example of worst practice is revealing. According to Schmidt (2009, pp. 11ff.), 
until the mid-1980s the Washington, DC police force was one of the best in the USA. 
Applicants were selected for police academy training based on a general intelligence 
test and a background investigation. The mayor, Marion Barry, eliminated this 
procedure with several consequences: the drop-out rate among the police increased 
(80% of the new hires were incapable of completing the required training); the content 
of academy training was eased; the police officers being produced were frequently 
incompetent (murder indictments were dismissed because the reports written by the 
officers on the scene were unintelligible, solution rates for murder cases declined, 
firearms accidents soared because officers did not know how to use weapons properly, 
and crime on the police force became more common). 
This example highlights not only the consequences of test abandonment for hiring 
decisions and its cognitive outcomes, but also the effects of bad government on the 
quality of institutions. Such a view is backed by systematic studies of the impact of 
human capital on institutions and growth: (Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & 
Shleifer, 2004, p. 297f.): “Much evidence points to the primacy of human capital for 
both growth and democratization. ... The first order effect comes from human and social 
capital, which shape both institutional and productive capacities of a society.” See also 
Jones and Potrafke (2014). 
The traditional human capital and cognitive ability approaches assume that their 
constructs show an impact on the achievement of individuals. However, in addition they 
have effects at higher order levels. First, there is a simple aggregation effect. Ability 
and achievement averaged across different individuals will lead to corresponding results 
at an aggregated level (e.g., intelligence and income: individual level across individuals: 
r=.35, Kramer, 2009; national level across nations, GNP/GNI per capita: r=.57 to .77, 
Lynn & Vanhanen, 2012a, p. 76f.). Second, there are interaction effects as the ability 
level of others in groups influences the behavior and cognitive development of 
individuals. Additionally, intelligence furthers cooperation within institutions (Jones, 
2008). Third, there are also interaction effects insofar as the ability level of individuals 
and groups influences the quality of institutions and the institutions again have an 
impact on individual and group development (e.g., through the instructional quality of 
teachers; Chetty et al., 2011; Rindermann & Heller, 2005). This could be extended from 
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classes and schools to administrative bodies, companies, politics, countries and cultures. 
E.g., economies and societies at a higher ability level are likely to develop new and 
complex technology and will absorb innovations from other countries more quickly 
(Jones, 2012). Intelligence also reduces corruption (Potrafke, 2012), and more 
intelligent people tend to prefer pro-market policies (Caplan & Miller, 2010), both of 
which have a positive impact on economic growth.  
Studies at the macro-social level usually show high correlations between average 
cognitive ability and productivity (GDP) or income (GNI), where average cognitive 
ability is assessed on the basis of intelligence tests or student achievement tests. The test 
results are also typically related to the average number of years in primary, secondary 
and tertiary schools or the percentage of the population with secondary school 
qualifications. Correlations (r) between cognitive ability and production or income are 
usually between r=.50 and .80 (Lynn & Vanhanen, 2012b). 
However, in modernity the achievements of intellectual classes, high ability groups, 
called by Pritchett and Viarengo (2009) “global performers” or the “team in the tail”, 
who can “compete internationally” and “perform at a globally competitive level”, seem 
to be especially crucial for enhancing the production of wealth. Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2008) referred to them as “rocket scientists”. Their impact works via 
technological innovation and management of complexity in companies and 
administration – the last as a part of government effectiveness. Contrary to other forms 
of “capital” there seems to be no diminishing returns from cognitive ability: the higher 
the ability and the more intelligent persons there are, even at highest ability levels, the 
better (Robertson, Smeets, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2010; Wai, 2013). The existence and 
extent of such intellectual classes can be estimated in two different ways: the size of 
higher ability groups (e.g., the share above SAS≥600, equivalent to IQ≥115; Hanushek 
& Woessmann, 2009) or the ability level of the top group (e.g., brightest 5%; 
Rindermann, Sailer & Thompson, 2009)
1
. Both operationalizations cover not only a 
small elite, but a broader spectrum of cognitive workers including teachers, engineers, 
entrepreneurs, physicians, lawyers, normal scientists, managers, accountants and 
politicians, managing and working in the areas of education, innovation, economy, 
administration and politics. 
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2 A model of governance effects 
Good governance is a highly complex cognitive task. Leaders and administrators need 
to acquire and interpret information, frequently from multiple and even contradictory 
sources, process it in light of differing aims and values, and arrive at decisions. These 
decisions are only provisional because the evaluation of outcomes and changing 
conditions may call for fine-tuning or even revisions. To govern is to engage in complex 
problem solving as studied in simulations, e.g., being a company manager or the mayor 
of a community (Süß, 1999). We therefore assume that cognitive ability positively 
contributes to the quality of governance. Especially at the level of intellectual classes, 
which form the social basis for the government and political leaders, cognitive ability is 
likely to be highly important. This is backed by a study of Simonton (2006) for US 
presidents showing a positive relationship between intelligence and political success 
(r=.33). 
Good governance is studied under the term “government effectiveness.” As used by 
World Bank researchers, it is defined as the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010, p. 4). This 
government effectiveness is accompanied by further political criteria such as voice and 
accountability (democracy and political liberty), political stability and absence of 
violence (stability, low crime and peace), regulatory quality (the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development, related to economic freedom), rule of law (quality 
of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts), and control of corruption (low 
corruption). 
The governance model clashes with a pure concept of  liberalism, which generally 
views government interventions as a threat to the economy and the well-being of 
nations (Mises, 1996/1927; Hoppe, 2001). In contrast, we assume that good governance 
can produce conditions favorable to economic performance. First, governments can 
follow a more liberal or less liberal economic policy. If expressed in this way, we 
                                                                                                                                               
1
 More precisely, the intellectual classes’ level is the ability level at the 95th percentile rank, meaning the 
lower cognitive ability threshold of the top 5% group.  
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generally support a libertarian approach. Economic freedom is one of the most powerful 
means to stimulate economic growth (de Haan, Lundstrom & Sturm, 2006), leading to 
increased wealth and welfare, and is even reflected in human height (Western vs. 
Eastern Germany, South vs. North Korea; Komlos & Kriwy, 2003; Schwekendiek & 
Pak, 2009) and psychological well-being (Belasen & Hafer, 2012). 
However, good governance can do more than simply abstain from doing harm. 
Governments can stimulate the competitiveness of an economy, by setting rules (rule of 
law, low corruption), by supporting research and innovation, and by encouraging the 
development of human capital. As defined by the World Economic Forum, a country is 
said to be competitive to the extent that it has institutions, policies, and other factors that 
contribute to productivity (Schwab, 2013). Innovation is a central factor for the 
competitiveness. All these factors contribute through productivity to wealth – the 
possession of valuable assets. Governance, depending on cognitive ability of the general 
society, intellectual classes and political leaders, working through economic freedom, 
innovation and competitiveness, leading to productivity and wealth.  
Of course, this model, like others, is a simplification of reality and its complexity. 
What is missing is that, first, produced wealth needs to be maintained; a war, political 
chaos, or destructive government can reduce it. However, a model with a path from 
governance to wealth indirectly reflect these realities. More difficult to handle are 
backward effects (i.e., instances of reverse causality). Longitudinal designs with cross-
lagged effects can be used to detect them. Going further, there can be previously-
ignored additional variables such as geography or natural resources. Next, background 
variables such as culture, history, or genetic factors deserve consideration. While the 
first ones can be easily added, the letter ones are difficult to measure. Finally, there are 
always outliers and single country peculiarities such as an unexpected and sudden 
detection of mineral resources (e.g., Equatorial Guinea: the largest oil producer in sub-
Saharan Africa on a per-capita basis) or wars in neighboring countries, impairing one’s 
own society and economy (e.g., Jordan). In the case of special local and historical 
conditions a general model needs to be adapted. 
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3 Method 
[Remark for reviewers and editor: If wished, this part can be put into an appendix or online supplement 
and in this case we provide only some summary information.] 
3.1 Data 
Cognitive ability: Data from various student assessment studies were combined: 1. 
PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment – reading, mathematics and 
science literacy of 15 year old students), 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009; TIMSS, 1995, 1999, 




 graders); PIRLS, 2001, 2006, 
2011 (Reading literacy of 4
th
 graders). 2. If for certain countries no data could be 
obtained from PISA, PIRLS and TIMSS, older, regional or less representative studies 
were considered: IEA-Reading Literacy Study 1991 (9-year-old and 14-year-old 
students) and IAEP-II 1991 (International Assessment of Educational Progress, 
mathematics and science, 9- and 13-year-old students), LLECE 1997 and 2005-2006 
(Laboratorio Latinoamericano de Evaluación de la Calidad de la Educación, in third to 
sixth grade reading, mathematics and science), SACMEQ 1995-1998, 1999-2004, 2007 
(Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality; reading 
and mathematics in sixth grade), MLA 1999 (Monitoring Learning Achievement; 
literacy, numeracy and life skills in fourth grade), PASEC (Programme d’Analyse des 
Systèmes Éducatifs; French and mathematics in second and fifth grade, due to low 
comparability we took only mathematics), and results in the International Mathematical 
Olympiad (IMO). The scores from student assessments were combined with 
psychometric intelligence test data from Lynn and Vanhanen (2012a).  
Before averaging, the data were, if necessary and possible, corrected for age 
(depending on the country, students may be older or younger than the international 
average) and school attendance rates (depending on the country, more or less youth 
than an international average attends school). Student data from countries with only 
regional data were corrected to be more accurate as country estimates; IQ estimates (not 
directly measured) were also corrected. Obviously wrong results were excluded. Student 
assessment scores and psychometric IQ test results are highly correlated and form a 
strong international G-factor (r’s around .80 to .92; Coyle & Rindermann, 2013; Lynn 
& Vanhanen, 2012b). At the level of individuals, knowledge (which should be 
measured by SAS) and thinking (which should be better measured h by IQ tests) 
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influence each other (Maas et al., 2006; Rindermann, Flores-Mendoza & Mansur-Alves, 
2010). 
Many student assessment studies also provide data for the 95%-ability level 
(intellectual classes, high achievement groups). All data were standardized in an IQ-
metric. A detailed description of the procedure can be found in Rindermann (2014). The 
procedure is similar to the one used by Rindermann, Sailer and Thompson (2009). The 
assumption is that student-based data are good proxies for the general (adult) ability 
level in a society. Data are given for N=200 (cognitive ability mean) or N=98 countries 
(95%-ability level) and correlate at r=.97 (N=98; see Table 1). Correlations with the 
ability compilations of other researchers are high: r=.99 (average with average, N=200; 
IQ-student assessment average, Lynn & Vanhanen, 2012a), r=.88 (average with 
average, N=77; student assessment average, Hanushek & Woessmann, 2009) or r=.76 
(95%-ability level with percentage of students with SAS=600 or higher, equivalent to 
IQ≥115, N=74, same source), r=.94 (average with average, N=131; student assessment 
average, Altinok, Diebolt & De Meulemeester, 2013) or r=.88 (95%-ability level with 
percentage of students with SAS=600 or higher, equivalent to IQ≥115, N=96, same 
source). 
Competence of leading politicians: Data derived from educational levels (graduate 
education, at least a postgraduate qualification, 1, or not, 0) of Besley and Reynal-
Querol (2011).  In contrast to the original data set we coded every year (not only the 
inaugural year of a leader). To get a more reliable and valid measure we took a longer 
period, between 1960 and 2004. The correlation with a similar variable from 
Rindermann et al. (2009, “cognitive ability of leading politicians” based on educational 
degrees) is r=.44 (N=87, r=.62 not only using the graduate vs. not split). The Besley and 
Reynal-Querol sample covers a much larger country sample (N=182 vs. 94), thus we 
used their data. Data are given for N=182 countries.  
Government effectiveness: Data come from the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay & 
Mastruzzi, 2010, update 2012) and stand for the quality of public services, its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 
Data for the period 1996-2011 are given for N=200 countries. 
Competence and Governance 
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Innovation: Data come from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO; 
Dutta & Lanvin, 2013). WIPO ranks countries according to their innovations in science, 
technology, economics and society based on seven pillars: Institutions including 
politics, human capital (education and research), infrastructure, market sophistication 
(credit and trade), business sophistication (knowledge workforce), knowledge and 
technology outputs, and creative outputs (including arts).The Global Innovation Index 
(GII) is used for the year 2013 (N=142 countries). 
Competitiveness: The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) from the World 
Economic Forum (WEF; Schwab, 2013) reflects the set of institutions, policies, and 
factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. This competitiveness is 
built upon twelve pillars: The quality of institutions including a proper management of 
public finances, the quality of infrastructure, the stability of the macroeconomic 
environment, a healthy workforce, a well educated workforce, efficient goods markets, 
efficiency and flexibility of the labor market, sound and well-functioning financial 
sector, technological readiness and innovation by the development of new technological 
and non-technological knowledge. There is some conceptual overlap with government 
effectiveness (quality of institutions), but a majority of the pillars are the result of good 
governance. Of course, innovation contributes to competitiveness, and these measures 
are highly correlated (r=.90, N=133). Data from the period 2006-2013 are given for 
N=148 countries. 
Economic freedom: Our economic freedom measure is based on the Fraser index 
(Gwartney, Lawson & Hall, 2013) and the Heritage index (Miller, Holmes & Feulner, 
2013). From Fraser we used the longitudinal chain-linked index; if for single countries 
data were not given but in the single year data set, we added them standardized on the 
group of countries having data in both variables (chain-linked, single year). The index 
takes on higher values in the presence of smaller government, an impartial legal system 
with secure property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade internationally, 
and modest regulation of credit markets, labor markets, and business. The Heritage 
index covers ten aspects in four categories: rule of law (property rights, freedom from 
corruption), limited government (fiscal freedom, government spending), regulatory 
efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom), and open markets 
(trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom). Fraser data are given for 1995 
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to 2011 (N=153), Heritage for 1995 to 2013 (N=181); the indices correlate with r=.86 
(N=152). The sum exists for N=182 countries (Cronbach-=.93). 
Economic productivity: We used as an intermediate criterion per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) 2010 from the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers & Aten, 
2012) in 2005 constant prices, with purchasing power parity (ppp) adapted to an 
international dollar (Laspeyres). ‘GDP’ indicates the produced per capita standard of 
living for one year. Because an increase at a lower level arguably has much more impact 
on the quality of life, we also used the natural logarithm of GDP. It transforms 
nonlinear, exponential increases in “currency units” to linear increases in more realistic 
“quality of life units”. However, GDP-logs do not offer understandable units. For 
communication purposes unlogged numbers are more useful. Data are given for N=189 
countries. 
Wealth: As a final criterion we used wealth holdings of households calculated per 
adult according to the Credit Suisse Research Institute (2013, Tables 2-1 and 2-4, 
current US dollar). Wealth is the marketable value of financial assets plus non-financial 
assets (principally housing and land) less debts. For comparisons official exchange rates 
were used. We also used the natural logarithm of wealth. Data for the year 2013 come 
from N=174 countries. 
Sub-Saharan Africa: As a control we applied a geographical variable that 
distinguishes sub-Saharan African countries from the rest of the world. As in most 
international data sets until recently, Sudan was not split into a northern and southern 
part. 
Absolute latitude: As a further geographical control we used absolute latitude or 
antipodal latitude (distance from equator) derived from 
https://opendata.socrata.com/dataset/Country-List-ISO-3166-Codes-Latitude-
Longitude/mnkm-8ram. Compared with the data used by Sala-i-Martin (1997, based on 
the Barro-Lee collection) the correlation is r=.99 (N=133). The used variable represents 
the absolute latitude average of a country, not a population-weighted absolute latitude 
average (e.g., for Canada and Australia these distinctions are important). The same 
geographical method for latitude average is used in the CIA World Factbook. Data are 
given for N=202 countries. 
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Natural resources rents:  A final control used was total natural resources rents, 
calculated as the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral 
rents, and forest rents as a percent of GDP from the World Bank (2011).  Data come 
from the years 1995-2011 (average) for N=195 countries. 
3.2 Statistical analyses 
We performed correlation, regression and path analyses.  
Regression and path analyses are used to calculate direct, indirect, net and sum 
effects of variables. In these analyses the standardized path coefficients () between 
different variables must be interpreted. Correlations are always added in parentheses. 
Correlations help to quickly estimate the influence of other variables in a model (the 
larger the difference between a correlation and a path coefficient, the larger is the 
influence of other variables), and they make it possible to check the model (r=R²=1-
error) and to calculate the proportion of the explained variance in each factor (R²=r). 
“Good” values for fit indices (if models are not saturated) are SRMR.08 or SRMR.05 
and CFI.95 or CFI.97, and “acceptable” fit is reached with SRMR.10 and CFI.95. 
For the analyses, SPSS 22 and Mplus 5.21 were used. Significance tests were not used 
for interpretation (for an in-depth justification, see, e.g., Armstrong, 2007; Cohen, 1994; 
Gigerenzer, 2004). Especially at the macro-social level they are questionable for 
scientific reasoning. More instructive for inductive generalization – which is not 
possible with significance tests – is the demonstration of the stability of relationships if 
control variables are included (or across different country samples, different variable 
operationalizations, different measurement points and various studies of different 
authors). We use full-information maximum likelihood (FIML). This means no listwise 
deletion in the case of missing data. All given information is used; behind single paths 
and correlations stand differing sample sizes and country compositions (see Table 1 for 
bivariate correlations).  
We present standardized coefficients. First, they are comparable across differently 
scaled predictors and criteria. Second, a majority of the variables do not have natural, 
understandable and widely-used scales. Thus, unstandardized results would be less 
meaningful. 
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4 Results 
Table 1 around here please 
Figure 1 around here please 
 
Table 1 shows the correlations among the variables. All macrosocial variables are 
positively correlated except for the sub-Saharan Africa dummy (Africa as 1, rest of 
world 0) and natural resources rents (NNR) as a percent of GDP. At a country level a 
relatively high level of natural resources rents seems to be an indicator of lesser 
economic development. Of course, high NNRs are numerically possible only if other 
incomes based on technology or services are low. However, longitudinally, natural 
resources could harm economic productivity in non-resource based sectors (“Dutch 
disease”; Corden & Neary, 1982). 
There is only a minor correlation between the society’s cognitive ability mean and 
the educational level of its political leaders (taken as an indicator of their competence): 
r=.15 (with ability mean, N=181) or r=.14 (with top ability level, N=92). It is typically 
the case that political leaders hail from the better-educated and higher-competence strata 
of society. Additionally, educational degrees are difficult to compare across different 
countries. However, there is considerable variation across regions with the West (North-
West-Middle Europe, North America and Australia-New Zealand) having on average 
the best-educated politicians (on a scale between 0, not graduated, and 1, graduated, 
M=0.50, SD=0.27, N=18 countries) and the Arab-Muslim world the least-educated 
(M=0.15, SD=0.27, N=20), with sub-Saharan Africa also low (M=0.18, SD=0.29, 
N=47).
2
 As expected, a reasonably high correlation is found between the political 
leaders’ level and government effectiveness (r=.36, N=181). 
 
Table 2 around here please 
 
The cognitive ability mean and the top ability level have differing country sample sizes 
(N=200 vs. N=98). Comparing them in the same country sample across all our given 
variables (N=88) shows that the top ability level is more predictive for all positive 
                                                 
2
 East-Asian politicians tend to be not very highly educated -- in contrast to the high test scores of East 
Asian students and adults (M=0.16, SD=0.28, N=7). 
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economic variables, e.g., for government effectiveness (r=.65 vs. r=.69), but not for the 
non-economic variables: the sub-Saharan Africa dummy, natural resources rents and 
absolute latitude (see Table 2). We see this as evidence for the intellectual classes 
theory. I.e., the ability level of cognitive elites is crucial in modernity. Across different 
regions and cultures there is a close relationship (see Figure 1, scatterplot). The 
relationship appears to be slightly curvilinear, consistent with a view that government 
effectiveness has a low threshold. Lower levels may be avoided by the positive 
influence of advisors from international organizations, support by local but abroad 
educated experts (e.g., at universities in North America and Europe) and by copying the 
institutional features of developed countries. 
Government effectiveness, innovation and competitiveness are highly correlated 
(r=.90 to .92). There is some conceptual overlap. However, competent government 
supports innovation and competitiveness by the fostering of research and economic 
freedom. Similarly, economic freedom is highly (but somewhat less) correlated with 
these three variables (r=.76 to .81). 
The sub-Saharan Africa dummy correlates negatively with cognitive, technological 
and economic modernity indicators. In the total sample, the cognitive ability mean and 
GDP-log show the highest negative correlations (r=-.67 and -.64). In a same country 
sample of N=88 the highest correlations could be found with the cognitive ability mean 
and top ability level (r=-.44 and -.37). However, there are only data for four African 
countries in all variables (Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius and South Africa), and one of 
these countries (Mauritius) is, for the most part, not populated by sub-Saharan African 
people. 
Absolute latitude, the distance from the equator, is positively correlated with all 
developmental indicators. The highest correlation is found for the cognitive ability 
mean (r=.69). In the same country sample the highest correlations are with cognitive 
ability (r=.62), top ability level (r=.60) and innovation (r=.51). 
As mentioned before, natural resources rents are negatively correlated with 
developmental and modernity indicators. The highest negative correlations are found for 
economic freedom and government effectiveness (r=-.39 and -.34). 
Generally, the logarithmic productivity and wealth measures are more highly 
correlated with developmental indicators than the same measures in usual money units 
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(differences in correlation of about .10 or .20). The logarithm converts nonlinear, 
exponential increases to linear ones appropriate for conventional statistical analyses 
such as correlation, regression and path analyses. Also the correlation between one 
year’s productivity, GDP, and the result of long term productivity, wealth, increases by 
using the logarithmic transformation, from r=.73 to r=.92 (N=172). Both indicators 
correlate most highly with competitiveness (r=.72 to r=.87), innovation (r=.68 to r=.86) 
and government effectiveness (r=.70 to r=.84). Assuming no backward effects (which is 
rather simplistic), these three factors are the most important variables for a country’s 
wealth. However, even without backward effects from wealth these factors are not 
exogenous variables. They depend, e.g., on the competence of political leaders and the 
country’s cognitive ability level. These relationships were examined by using path 
analyses. 
 
Table 3 around here please 
Figure 2 around here please 
 
Before showing results from path analyses we want to mention the limits of 
conventional regression studies (see Table 3). Regression analysis cannot typically 
capture both direct and indirect effects. Thus, the relevance of background factors such 
as cognitive ability will be underestimated insofar as it operates (indirectly) through an 
impact on governance and institutions. Additionally, the traditional use of 
unstandardized coefficients in regression analysis may lead to confusion with respect to 
predictors using differing scales. Organizations have developed their own scales (from 1 
to 10 or 1 to 100 or –3 to +3) and use different segments within scales. Unstandardized 
effects are not strictly comparable in such a context. The only message we can take 
from our regression analysis is that government effectiveness is more important than 
other factors for wealth. 
These problems are resolved by using path analyses and presenting the results in 
terms of standardized effects. Figure 2 shows a path analysis using productivity and 
wealth criteria in usual money units. The fit is very good CFI=.98 and SRMR=.03, and 
the chosen model is consistent with the empirical covariations between the variables. 
The cognitive ability mean and the top cognitive ability level are highly correlated 
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(r=.98). The correlation slightly deviates from the one calculated by SPSS (r=.97). First, 
Mplus estimates correlations in a slightly different way (Muthen, 2009), and second, 
there could be some minor rounding errors. In the first model we do not consider any 
effects of the average cognitive ability of a society. However, intellectual classes come 
from the general society. In any case, the top cognitive ability level has a positive 
impact on the competence of leading politicians (95%CClP=.17), on government 
effectiveness (95%GovE=.62), innovation (95%Inno=.36) and competitiveness 
(95%Com=.16). These are all theoretically highly convincing paths insofar as people 
working in these fields must have high cognitive ability to satisfy work requirements. 
The competence of leading politicians also has a positive impact on government 
effectiveness (CClPGovE=.26). Leading politicians manage government and affect 
government effectiveness. They set the general conditions, and they select the staff for 
administration. As a prime example, consider in Singapore longtime Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew (university degree with double First Class Honours from Cambridge): “I 
realized that the more talented people I had as ministers, administrators, and 
professionals, the more effective my policies were, and the better the results” (Yew, 
2000, p. 135). According to the World Bank, Singapore’s government effectiveness has 
been the second highest of the 200 countries evaluated. 
Government effectiveness is crucial for economic freedom (GovEEF=.81). The two 
concepts are theoretically distinguishable. A competent government pays attention to 
economic liberty because it is a means to achieve higher competitiveness, economic 
growth and wealth. However, some backward effects (economic freedom fosters not 
only economic productivity, but also has a positive impact on government 
effectiveness) cannot be excluded. Testing this, a longitudinal analysis using cross-
lagged effects for 135 countries between the middle of the 1990s and 2010 (see Figure 
3) shows that government effectiveness has had in the past a stronger effect on 
economic freedom (GovE96EF10=.29) than economic freedom on government 
effectiveness (EF95GovE10=.06). Thus the direction of our chosen path is empirically 
backed. 
 
Figure 3 around here please 
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Similarly, government effectiveness has a positive impact on competitiveness (Figure 2, 
directly and indirectly via economic freedom, direct: GovECom=.38; indirect: 
GovE(ind)Com=.81.08=.06; total: GovE(tot)Com=.38+.06=.44), on innovation 
(GovEInno=.67) and on productivity (direct: GovEGDP=.26; indirect via economic 




Productivity (GDP per capita) directly depends on competitiveness (ComGDP=.49) 
and government effectiveness (GovEGDP=.26; total effect: GovE(tot)GDP=.60).  
 
Figure 4 around here please 
 
Wealth (per adult) directly depends on yearly productivity (GDPWealth=.37) and 
government effectiveness (GovEWealth=.51; indirect: GovE(ind)Wealth=.22; total effect: 
GovE(tot)Wealth=.73). The analysis of longitudinal data (for only a ten year interval) for 
reciprocal effects between government effectiveness and wealth did not yield a clear 
result (see Figure 4). Depending on how the wealth data were used (in monetary units or 
logarithmic form) government effectiveness or wealth had a stronger effect (monetary 
units: GovE00Wealth10=.20 vs. Wealth00GovE10=-.02; logarithm: GovE00Wealth10=.09 vs. 
Wealth00GovE10=.12). There seem to be reciprocal effects. A cross-sectional model is in 
this respect not sufficiently complex. 
 
Figure 5 around here please 
 
In a final path analysis (Figure 5) we have used logarithmic versions of GDP and 
wealth. This model has as a feature that wealth increases in the lower tail receive more 
emphasis. Lower tail increases are arguably more important for the improvement of 
quality of life than wealth increases in the upper tail. Additionally, using the logarithm 
converts nonlinear, exponential increases to linear ones. We also added three controls 
for wealth, a sub-Saharan African dummy, absolute latitude and natural resources rents. 
Finally, we added a direct path from the cognitive ability mean to productivity 
                                                 
3
 Indirect effects of government effectiveness on GDP: (.67.37.49)+(.38.49)+(.81.08.49)=.34. 
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(CAMGDPl=.24). If we set such a path for a linear measure of GDP – i.e., GDP in a 
nonlogarithmic form – the result is zero (CAMGDP=.00). Why is there such a 
remarkable difference? Taking the logarithm means stressing differences at the lower to 
average levels of the GDP distribution across countries. Compared to the influence of 
intellectual classes (measured by the cognitive level of the 95
th
 percentile), the influence 
of the average ability range (as indicated by the cognitive ability of the general society) 
is larger at the average levels of the GDP distribution. The impact of competitiveness 
and government effectiveness is only slightly changed (ComGDPl=.45, minus .04; 
GovEGDPl=.24, minus .02). The impact of GDP on wealth is increased dramatically, 
from GDPWealth=.37 to GDPlWealthl=.70, and the direct effect of government 
effectiveness decreases, from GovEWealth=.51 to GovEWealthl=.29. 
The total impact of government effectiveness on wealth is now GovE(tot)Wealthl=.68, 
and somewhat smaller than for wealth in monetary units (the total impact of government 
effectiveness for not-log was: .73).
4
 
The additional control variables in a model with cognitive ability mean, top cognitive 
ability, competence of politicians, government effectiveness, innovation, 
competitiveness, economic freedom and depending on them: GDP, cannot explain 
further variance in wealth (expressed in logarithmic form): The sub-Saharan African 
dummy has nearly no effect (sSAWealthl=-.04), and absolute latitude (ALatWealthl=.04) 
and natural resources rents (NRRWealthl=.03) likewise have only trivial impacts. 
Together they explain only 4% of the variance in national wealth, whereas government 
effectiveness by itself directly explains 24%.
5
 However, the substantial correlations 
between the sub-Saharan African dummy and wealth (in parentheses: r=-.58) and 
between absolute latitude (distance to the equator) and wealth (r=.52) show a closer 
relationship. But in our model the other human capital, political and economic attributes 
of societies can explain the given wealth differences that are associated with geography. 
Geography is not relevant – unless it is assumed that it influences the predictor variables 
in our model, e.g., via culture.  
                                                 
4
 Calculation of total effect of government effectiveness on log-wealth: 
.29+((.24+(.68.37.45)+(.40.45)+(.81.08.45)).70)=.68 (.683666). 
5
 Calculation of the variance explained in log-wealth by the three controls:  
(-.04-.58)+(.04.52)+(.03-.09)=.04. 
Calculation of the variance explained in log-wealth by government effectiveness: .29.83=.24. 
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The total effect of government effectiveness on wealth is GovE(tot)Wealthl=.68. The 
total effect of competence of leading politicians on wealth is CClP(tot)Wealthl=.18.
6
 The 
total effect of cognitive ability mean on wealth is CAM(tot)Wealthl=.17.
7
 Here we have 
not considered that the intellectual classes come from the general society. Finally, the 
total effect of the top cognitive ability level on wealth is 95% (tot)Wealthl=.54.
8
 







, and 95% (tot)GDPl=.50
12
. 
Thus, government effectiveness is seen to be the crucial political-institutional variable 
in understanding productivity and wealth differences between countries. Since 
government effectiveness depends on the cognitive competence of politicians and the 
intellectual class, it is not easy to change administrative and bureaucratic structures in a 
sustainable way. 
5 Discussion 
Our aim has been to empirically analyze the impact of good governance on economic 
productivity and wealth. We took as our measure of good governance the government 
effectiveness concept of the World Bank (quality of policy formulation and its 
implementation through public services). Government effectiveness depends positively 
on the intellectual class’s ability level (the level of the top ability group at the 95th 
percentile, total effect: 95%(tot)GovE=.66) and on the cognitive competence of leading 
                                                 
6
 Calculation of competence of leading politicians on log-wealth: Taking the above .68 and multiplying 
with .26 = .18 (.17775316). 
7
 Calculation of cognitive ability mean on log-wealth: .24.70=.17 (.168). 
8
 Calculation of total effect of top cognitive ability level on log-wealth: We took the government 
effectiveness effect (.68 written for .683666): 
(.17.26.68)+(.62.68)+(.36.37.45.70)+(.14.45.70)=.54 (.540148957). 
9
 Calculation of total effect of government effectiveness on log-GDP: 
.24+(.68.37.45)+(.40.45)+(.81.08.45)=.56 (.56238). 
10
 Calculation of competence of leading politicians on log-GDP: Taking the above .56 and multiplying 
with .26 = .15 (.1462188). 
11
 Calculation of cognitive ability mean on log-GDP: Simply taking the direct effect of .24. 
12
 Calculation of total effect of top cognitive ability level on log-GDP: We took the government 
effectiveness effect (.56 written for .56238): (.17.26.56)+(.62.56)+(.36.37.45)+(.14.45)=.50 
(.496472796). 




). Using these two variables, we can explain 51-52 
percent of the cross-national variation in government effectiveness.
14
  
Of course, government policy and its implementation are also subject to ideological 
currents, and even intelligent people can be influenced by bad ideas. We can shake our 
heads about Mao Zedong and Adolf Hitler, but they and the people they governed in 
their times were not lacking in general intelligence. From 1995 to 2010, however – the 
period for which we have assembled quantitative evidence – there developed a fair 
degree of consensus among intellectual people in support of free and open markets and 
more generally of political freedom and rule of law. 
Government effectiveness has a positive impact by supporting economic freedom, 
innovation and competitiveness, which in turn affect economic productivity (GDP per 
capita, total impact: GovE(tot)GDPl=.56) and wealth (per adult, total: 
GovE(tot)Wealthl=.68). Our final model (Figure 5) using GDP and wealth in logarithmic 
form explains a whopping 73 percent (GDP) and 88 percent (wealth) of the cross-
national variation in these variables. Compared to economic freedom (total on GDP: 
EF(tot)GDPl=.04, total wealth: EF(tot)Wealthl=.03
15
) the impact of government 
effectiveness is much larger. This result can also be inferred from the higher 
correlations between government effectiveness and GDP/wealth than between economic 
freedom and GDP/wealth (Table 1, mean across the four indicators: rGovE=.78 vs. 
rEF=.64). Additional geographic and natural resources controls have only a minor 
impact (<|.05|). 
In the context of technological and social modernity, featuring increases in the 
complexity of economies, politics and daily life (e.g., the coordination of supplies and 
production, the management of financial assets, the competent operation of technology 
as in telephones, TVs and cars), good governance is the crucial factor for producing and 
maintaining national wealth.  
                                                 
13
 For the effect of competence of leading politicians on government effectiveness direct and total effects 
are identical (only one effect). 
14
 Taken from the Mplus output. It can be also calculated by this, using Figure 2 or Figure 5: 
(.62.67)+(.26.36)=.51; (.62.69)+(.26.37)=.52. There are minor differences in correlations between 
SPSS and Mplus and in the correlations between the two models calculated by Mplus.  
15
 For the effect of economic freedom on GDP and wealth indirect and total effects are identical; taken 
from the final model in Figure 5. 
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As in previous studies (Rindermann et al., 2009) the level of the top ability group 
(“intellectual classes”, “smart fractions”, “rocket scientists”, “the team in the tail”) had 
the strongest impact on economic performance. Cognitive capitalism is built upon 
intellectual classes.  
However, we should not forget the limitations of our model: First, there are 
backward, reciprocal effects: wealth may also have an impact on government 
effectiveness (here Figure 4), GDP has also an effect on economic freedom 
(Rindermann, 2012, Figures 1 and 2 therein) and economic freedom a small one on 
government effectiveness (here Figure 3). But there is no hint that wealth/GDP 
longitudinally has a stronger impact on government effectiveness than on economic 
freedom. Rather, the opposite is true: there is longitudinally a stronger effect of 
wealth/GDP on economic freedom. Thus, the stronger cross-sectional statistical impact 
of government effectiveness on GDP/wealth than of economic freedom on GDP/wealth 
is not due to a stronger reciprocal effect of GDP/wealth on government effectiveness. 
What we have not analyzed here are backward effects of wealth on cognitive ability. 
Previous longitudinal analyses at the international level (Rindermann, 2012) have 
shown that the cognitive human capital effect on GDP/wealth is larger than the 
backward effect of GDP/wealth on cognitive human capital (see also Christainsen, 
2013). Research has shown that there are poor regions with low cognitive ability levels 
(Africa or Bali; Rindermann, 2013; Rindermann & te Nijenhuis, 2012), but also poor 
regions with average to high ability levels (Vietnam; Rindermann, Hoang & 
Baumeister, 2013) and rich regions with rather low ability levels (Emirates; 
Rindermann, Baumeister & Gröper, 2013). However, developing countries often 
experience a “brain drain” from their intellectual classes (Kapur & McHale, 2005) 
because developed countries provide better political, economic and institutional 
working and living conditions for them (political stability, security, contract safety, 
prospects for promotion, interaction with highly competent others). Africa in particular 
suffers from this talent loss. 
Second, further effects of government effectiveness on the control of corruption, rule 
of law and human capital policies (leading to productivity and wealth) are not covered 
by our model. Further studies can try to integrate them.  
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Third, we have not considered general background variables such as culture and 
history including evolutionary history. Genes and evolutionary history appear to have 
effects at the cross-country level (Ashraf & Galor, 2013; Meisenberg & Woodley, 2013; 
Putterman & Weil, 2010; Rindermann, Woodley & Stratford, 2012; Spolaore & 
Wacziarg, 2013), but no concrete gene-ability-relationships applicable to cross-country 
analyses have yet been found.
16
 Thus, their explanatory value (as compared to their 
statistical one) is small. Culture is a somewhat fuzzy concept. However, developing a 
theory going out from world views and values influencing behavior in education, 
learning, thinking, work and dealing with others (Weber, 2008/1904; Harrison, 2006) 
may explain, after properly operationalizing such a theory, differences in our factors 
from cognitive ability to governance. 
Fourth, our model is a general one. Historical analyses of single countries and 
regions may shed light on special regional and historical paths to wealth. 
Fifth, there are concerns about the rating approach. Experts evaluating indicators for 
different political and economic criteria (government effectiveness, economic freedom, 
innovation and competitiveness) may be influenced by halo effects. For example, they 
may perceive a competitive economy and therefore infer that there is a high level of 
innovation. However, all global indicators are based on more specific ones. For some of 
the specific ones there are objective measures. For others, guidelines exist as to how to 
score them. Nevertheless, it would be better if the research organizations would 
alternatively provide only measured indicators for their concepts. 
Finally, productivity and wealth may be important for the well-being of nations, but 
well-being itself is a broader concept encompassing psychological health and political  
values – liberty, democracy, autonomy, civil society (“bürgerliche Gesellschaft”), rule 
of law, peace, and a low crime rate (e.g., Ura, Alkire, Zangmo & Wangdi, 2012). 
However, previous research (Rindermann et al., 2009; Vanhanen, 2011) as well as the 
present paper offers evidence that cognitive ability contributes to all of the above. Good 
governance would be aimed at improving these outcomes via health, demographic, 
education and cultural change policies (Heckman, 2000; Hunt, 2012). 
                                                 
16
 Possibly the first exception is the study of Piffer (2013). However, further research will be needed to 
establish the causal path from genes via proteins and neurological processes to intelligence and cross-
country differences in gene frequencies. 
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 Table 1: Correlation matrix, all used variables 









































r 1 .97 .15 .66 .82 .79 .43 -.67 .69 -.17 .55 .73 .60 .75 
p . .00 .04 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 .00 .00 
N 200 98 181 195 142 148 182 200 199 191 188 188 174 174 




r .97 1 .14 .70 .81 .69 .49 -.33 .58 -.33 .47 .70 .60 .69 
p .00 . .18 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 





r .15 .14 1 .36 .23 .19 .30 -.20 .19 -.28 .14 .23 .21 .24 
p .04 .18 . .00 .01 .03 .00 .01 .01 .00 .07 .00 .01 .00 





r .66 .70 .36 1 .92 .90 .81 -.42 .50 -.34 .70 .79 .77 .84 
p .00 .00 .00 . .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 




r .82 .81 .23 .92 1 .90 .78 -.49 .61 -.30 .68 .81 .81 .86 
p .00 .00 .01 .00 . .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 




r .79 .69 .19 .90 .90 1 .76 -.52 .52 -.16 .72 .84 .77 .87 
p .00 .00 .03 .00 .00 . .00 .00 .00 .06 .00 .00 .00 .00 





r .43 .49 .30 .81 .78 .76 1 -.32 .32 -.39 .57 .65 .63 .71 
p .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 . .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 





r -.67 -.33 -.20 -.42 -.49 -.52 -.32 1 -.46 .10 -.36 -.64 -.31 -.61 
p .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 . .00 .16 .00 .00 .00 .00 




r .69 .58 .19 .50 .61 .52 .32 -.46 1 -.14 .38 .52 .48 .56 
p .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 . .05 .00 .00 .00 .00 
N 199 98 181 196 142 148 182 200 200 192 189 189 174 174 






r -.17 -.33 -.28 -.34 -.30 -.16 -.39 .10 -.14 1 .03 .00 -.14 -.05 
p .02 .00 .00 .00 .00 .06 .00 .16 .05 . .70 .99 .07 .49 




r .55 .47 .14 .70 .68 .72 .57 -.36 .38 .03 1 .79 .73 .75 
p .00 .00 .07 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .70 . .00 .00 .00 





r .73 .70 .23 .79 .81 .84 .65 -.64 .52 .00 .79 1 .64 .92 
p .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .99 .00 . .00 .00 





r .60 .60 .21 .77 .81 .77 .63 -.31 .48 -.14 .73 .64 1 .77 
p .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .07 .00 .00 . .00 





r .75 .69 .24 .84 .86 .87 .71 -.61 .56 -.05 .75 .92 .77 1 
p .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .49 .00 .00 .00 . 
N 174 95 169 174 138 142 170 174 174 172 172 172 174 174 
 
Table 2: Correlations between cognitive ability measures and the other variables in a same country sample 































Cognitive ability mean 
r .13 .65 .79 .65 .41 -.44 .62 -.37 .38 .63 .58 .66 
p .23 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Top (95%) ability level  
r .15 .69 .81 .67 .47 -.37 .60 -.36 .44 .69 .60 .68 
p .17 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Notes: N=88. 
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Table 3: Prediction of wealth (logarithm, regression analysis) 
Predictor Standardized regression 
coefficient () 
Predictor scale Unstandardized effect for wealth in monetary units 
(only direct effects, not indirect; in current US dollar) 
Top (95%) ability level .07 IQ, from (empirically) around 77 to 126, M=108.42, 
SD=10.31 
+ 1 IQ point  + $ 777  
Government effectiveness .48 World Bank scale, from (empirically) around –2.50 to 
+2.50, M=0.54, SD=0.88 
+ 1 WB scale point  + $ 60.836 
Innovation .10 WIPO scale, from (empirically) around 19 to 67, 
M=42.60, SD=10.38 
+ 1 WIPO scale point  + $ 1.012 
Competitiveness .24 WEF scale, from (empirically) around 2.60 to 5.80, 
M=4.47, SD=0.57 
+ 1 WEF scale point  + $ 45.734 
Economic freedom .08 Fraser scale, from (empirically) around 1.50 to 9.20, 
M=7.06, SD=0.77 
+ 1 Fraser scale point  + $ 11.507 
Notes: The five most relevant predictors used, N=91 (listwise deletion); means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of our 91 country sample, minima and 
maxima from data samples of the variables covering more countries; economic freedom is based on Fraser and Heritage, the Heritage data were adapted 









































































































































Figure 1: Scatterplot between top cognitive ability level (intellectual classes) and 
government effectiveness, United Kingdom average (UKav/mean, not 95
th
 
percentile) is set at IQ 100, countries indicated by country code (ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 
code), N=98 nations  
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Figure 2: Path analysis for cognitive ability, institutional and economic variables and 
wealth in monetary units, standardized path coefficients (and correlations in 
parentheses, FIML, error term as unexplained variance, CFI=.98, SRMR=.03), 















Figure 3: Analysis of cross-lagged effects between government effectiveness and 
economic freedom in a 15 year interval (standardized path coefficients, correlations 
in parentheses, CFI=1.00, SRMR=.00), N=135 nations  
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Figure 4: Analysis of cross-lagged effects between government effectiveness and 
wealth in a 10 year interval (standardized path coefficients, correlations in 
parentheses, CFI=1.00, SRMR=.00, in brackets [ ] results for wealth logarithm), 
















































Figure 5: Path analysis for cognitive ability, institutional and economic variables and 
wealth (logarithm), with direct path of average cognitive ability on log GDP 
(standardized path coefficients, correlations in parentheses, FIML, error term as 
unexplained variance, CFI=.98, SRMR=.03), N=201 nations  
